A detailed account of the development of the photovoltaic industry over a decade

Tracing the source of chaos: The development path of non-marketization and other industries is different, and the photovoltaic industry is taking a policy-supporting route.

If you sort out all kinds of chaos in the photovoltaic industry in the past decade, it is not difficult to find that it may be precisely because of this source that everything will be born.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, renewable energy such as wind power, bioenergy, and solar energy have become not only the darling of the investment community, but also have become strategic targets for countries to compete for development. In order to solve the problem of new energy costs higher than traditional energy, countries generally adopt subsidies.

At the beginning of this century, Germany and Spain took the lead to launch a project to subsidize the development of solar photovoltaic power generation. Soon, Germany introduced a feed-in tariff method to raise the support of the photovoltaic industry to a higher level. “Using a regulation to achieve renewable energy that was not economically viable can be developed in a market-based manner,” commented Zhao Yuwen, vice chairman of the China Renewable Energy Society and director of the Photovoltaic Professional Committee.

Under the circumstance of strategic emerging industries, renewable energies, etc., especially in the context of policy support from governments of all countries, the photovoltaic industry is running at an unexpected speed in the world and in China.

The data shows that during the ten years between 2002 and 2011, the annual average growth rate of the global photovoltaic industry was 53%. The development of China's photovoltaic industry is even more than people's imagination. During the five years from 2003 to 2007, the average annual growth rate of China's photovoltaic industry was 191.3%. In less than 10 years, China has created a world-class industry.

In 2003, China's solar cell output was 12 MW, and in 2004 it was 50 MW. By 2005, production had soared to 139 megawatts, and in 2006 it reached 400 megawatts. In 2007, China's solar cell output reached 1,088 megawatts for the first time, surpassing Japan (920 megawatts) and Europe (1062.8 megawatts), making it the world's largest producer of solar cells. In 2007, the output of photovoltaic modules in China also reached the top in the world. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 2007, the domestic output of photovoltaic modules reached 1,717 megawatts, an increase of 138% over the previous year.

PV companies have also soared. According to the statistics of the Saidi Think Tank Photovoltaic Research Institute, in 2007 there were more than 50 domestic solar cell production companies, more than 70 silicon ingot/silicon wafer manufacturers, and more than 200 photovoltaic module manufacturers. Currently, among the top ten polysilicon, wafer, solar cell and component companies in the world, China holds 4, 6, 6 and 6 seats respectively.

Even in the winter that has experienced the world financial crisis, China's photovoltaic industry continues to show signs of strength in 2011. Polysilicon production reached 84,000 tons; solar module production reached 21GW, an increase of 100% year-on-year, accounting for 60% of the world's total output; industry output value exceeded 300 billion yuan.

China deserves to be the fastest growing and most productive country in the world's solar photovoltaic industry.

One of chaos: Follow-up effect Some people say that China's participation in this photovoltaic giant gambling is the birth of Wuxi Suntech's wealth myth.

In 2000, Shi Zhengrong was only a returnee with a few years working for money to return home to start a business. After a failed lobbying, he found the city government of Wuxi. The latter was eye-catching, and let eight state-owned enterprises such as Wuxi Little Swan Group, Hawthorn Pharmaceuticals, and Wuxi High-tech Venture Capital Co., Ltd. join together for a total of 6.5 million U.S. dollars, and jointly funded the establishment of Suntech Wuxi with Shi Zhengrong, and made good preparations. ready. At this time, Shi Zhengrong himself took shares in technical stocks and $400,000 in cash, which accounted for 25% of the company's shares.

He once thought that on December 14, 2005, Wuxi Suntech Power Co., Ltd. was listed on the New York Stock Exchange with an opening price of $20.35. Based on this calculation, Shi Zhengrong, who holds 68 million shares, has soared to 1.384 billion U.S. dollars and became one of the top five Chinese richest people on the day. After that, the stock price of the company rose again to 40 US dollars. In 2006, Shi Zhengrong’s net worth surged to 2.3 billion US dollars, becoming China’s richest man of the year.

From 400,000 to 2 billion U.S. dollars, Shi Zhengrong’s worth has increased more than 5,000 times in six years. This dazzling wealth effect instantly triggered China's great passion for the photovoltaic industry.

In just a few years, the country has established dozens of photovoltaic industrial parks. Many old companies and listed companies have also transformed, including Langsha Group, Bosideng, and Samsung, which have announced their entry into the photovoltaic industry.

Since 2005, in less than two years, 10 Chinese PV companies have been listed overseas. In addition to Wuxi Suntech, there are Zhejiang Yuhui, Suzhou CTS, Jiangsu Linyang, Changzhou Trina Solar, Baoding Yingli, and Jiangsu Xin. In February 2008, Shenzhen Topsun and Jinzhou Sunshine were listed in Hong Kong and China respectively. As of August 2012, among the top ten listed foreign PV companies in China, the top eight market capitalizations were all over US$100 million.

How do you set aside projects, invest in, buy equipment, build factories, and produce products in the pursuit of Wuxi Suntech? How much money do you have to invest in photovoltaics? Statistics from the China Photovoltaic Committee of the China Renewable Energy Society on the construction of polysilicon projects in 2009 Maybe you can see it. According to the data, as of the first half of 2009, there were already 50 domestic polysilicon projects already under construction, under construction or proposed, with a completed production capacity of nearly 60,000 tons, a total construction scale of over 170,000 tons, and a total investment of over 100 billion yuan. . In this crazy pursuit, not only state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, but also township and village enterprises; not only local governments, venture capital, but also hot money.

For this wanton growth, some people laughed that any prediction for the photovoltaic industry would be a dangerous and ridiculous thing.

Some people are gravely concerned about what industries China is now engaged in. They are all four "one nests": Once new industries emerge, they are "hot spots"; and when the heat reaches a certain level, they become "cradle"; after repeated construction, It is "a bucket"; competition is intensifying and it faces "a nest of death." This is undoubtedly a great waste of resources.

The chaos of the two: If the two are out, if chasing wealth is the driving force behind the turmoil in the photovoltaic industry, then the huge demand in the European photovoltaic market will install an accelerator for this crazy chase.

China's photovoltaic industry is a strange industry, known as "two ends out", that is, more than 90% of raw materials rely on imports, and more than 90% of products need to be exported abroad.

This is almost entirely unique in the history of China's manufacturing industry.

As the production of solar panels requires up to 99.9999% of high-purity polysilicon, the domestic purification technology has not yet reached in the early, so the supply of polysilicon was once monopolized by foreign countries. In October 2008, the price of polysilicon soared in response to the short supply of battery components and a serious shortage of polysilicon production capacity in China, rising from US$50/kg to US$500. As a result, another strange phenomenon has been derived: "Since Silicon is king, production reaches gold", those who get "silicon" have the momentum of the world.

Although the issue of raw materials has been largely solved in the later period, by 2009, the import dependency of polysilicon has dropped to 60%. However, the industry's chronic illness, “market demand is out of the box,” has been lingering, and it eventually triggered a An upsurge of trade disputes.

While the domestic PV market is still in its embryonic stage, Europe, as the world's largest photovoltaic power generation market, accounts for more than 60% of the world's total installed capacity, showing a huge market demand. In the past five years, the output of China's photovoltaic industry was the largest in the world and accounted for more than half of the markets in Europe.

In 2011, China exported about 35.8 billion U.S. dollars of photovoltaic products, of which the total value of 21 billion euros, about 26.5 billion U.S. dollars, 166.5 billion yuan of solar panels and related components were exported to the European Union, and exports accounted for 70% of China's total photovoltaic exports. . Although China's exports of solar photovoltaic products to Europe fell by 45% year-on-year to US$11.19 billion in 2012, this still accounted for more than half of China's total exports of PV products of US$23.3 billion.

Europe is undoubtedly the largest exporter of photovoltaic products in China. If we add the United States, the entire European and American market will account for more than 80% of China's photovoltaic product exports. In the global context, China's photovoltaic products have monopolized 60% of them.

Faced with such a huge amount of Chinese PV products, some Europeans have expressed strong objections.

European Union Trade Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as the European Commission) De Gucht, who has performed radically in the EU “double reverse” case, said that the European Commission believes that the dumping margins of Chinese PV companies to the EU market are as high as 112.6% and damage to EU PV products. The degree is about 67.9%. The European Commission also believes that Chinese products have led to the bankruptcy of a considerable number of EU PV companies and have affected about 25,000 jobs in the EU.

According to the same view, the Commission of Trade of the European Commission, which is in charge of the “double counter” investigation, proposed that the EU should impose temporary anti-dumping duties with an average tax rate of 47% on China from June 6. Although this proposal was not implemented in the price coordination agreed between China and the EU in July, it is not difficult to see that this “market demand out of the box” model has caused a great deal of European dissatisfaction with China.

Shi Zhengrong stated in 2007 that “the current strong demand in the European market is in fact only a short-term phenomenon caused by the explosive growth of the market in Germany in the past two years. With strong technical strength, local European companies are bound to quickly reach between production capacity and demand. Balance. By that time, the European door may not be open to us."

Zhao Yuwen also expressed his worries about the phenomenon of “two ends out” in China's photovoltaic industry in 2007. However, in the face of huge market and demand, for those bloodthirsty capital, who can stop them from gaining wealth?

The chaos of the third: About high technology Ten years ago, "photovoltaic" is still a strange word for most people.

However, after 2003, especially when PV was used as a strategic emerging industry by various countries, the mysterious taste of science and technology was added to the unfamiliar taste of “photovoltaic”.

What kind of industry is PV?

Photovoltaic is the abbreviation of solar photovoltaic power generation system. It utilizes the photovoltaic effect of semiconductor materials of solar cells and directly converts radiant energy into electrical energy. There are two modes: independent operation and grid-connected operation. The industrial chain formed by the application and development of silicon materials is called the photovoltaic industry, including the production of high-purity polysilicon raw materials, production of solar cells, production of solar cell modules, and manufacturing of related production equipment.

In this industry chain, the purity of the upstream polysilicon manufacturing technology is the highest. From the top down, the technical threshold for production shows a declining trend. Over the years, the gap between China's polysilicon industry technology and the international advanced level has narrowed and the degree of import dependency has been reduced from 90% to 50%. However, the annual import base is still relatively large, at 80,000 tons.

At the same time, compared with the world's advanced level, there is still a big gap. Kong Li, a researcher at the Institute of Electrical Engineering at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a vice chairman of the China Renewable Energy Society, believes that there is a big gap between China's follow-up R&D of crystalline solar cells and R&D of thin-film solar cells, at least 10 years behind.

However, in some downstream batteries and components, the technology content is much lower. It is understood that China's battery production process and the international equivalent, has engaged in many companies, low barriers to business, low profits, and the fastest expansion, the largest output. The data shows that the profit gained from the production of battery modules in China is about 18% of the total profit of the final battery module products, and the profit ratio of battery chips and wafers production is about 17% and 13% respectively, which is far lower than that of polysilicon. Accounting for 52%.

In the photovoltaic inverter production process, a product can be easily produced by purchasing drawings, external technical guidance, and other methods. According to statistics from the National Quality Certification Center, about 53 companies have passed their certification. According to other statistics, at present, there are 135 manufacturers of photovoltaic inverters in China. The vast majority of them are just entering this field, and some are still in the pre-research and prototype production stages. In addition, there are also packaging areas. Due to the low technical and financial barriers, more than 170 packaging companies have emerged in China within a short period of time. The total packaging capacity is not less than 2 million kilowatts.

In this regard, Song Dunyuan, chief technology officer of Hebei Yingli Group, bluntly stated that China's photovoltaic industry's relevant standards are basically in a state of deficiency, so long as they have the money to do photovoltaics. Others call it "a labor-intensive manufacturing without technology" and "manufacturing with a high-tech coat."

In the entire photovoltaic industry chain, the technical content is uneven, some links are blank, and some other links even farmer entrepreneurs are able to deliver goods. The industry continues to set off a follow-up trend, and the overall scale expansion and advancement are not difficult. Understand.

The chaos of the fourth: about GDP

Zhao Yuwen once said: In China, when it comes to emerging industries, there is still a very good profit. From the perspective of GDP, it is not just an entrepreneur's business. It has become a measure of the achievements of local governments. standard.

In this way, the photovoltaic industry in China, in addition to the characteristics of worldwide government subsidies, is also tied with GDP.

Once upon a time, the photovoltaic industry became the darling of local government investment, and local governments have given many favorable conditions such as unpaid land, capital quotas, and electricity price subsidies. In order to attract more photovoltaic companies to settle their homes, local governments have resorted to various means to conduct favorable competition. Photovoltaic industry has become fiercely contested. The photovoltaic industry is overwhelming. Various proverbs and words are heard. “We plan to accelerate the development of silicon materials and photovoltaic industry by taking certain companies as the leader. Through several years of hard work, we will form three series of products including single crystals for solar cells, polycrystalline silicon wafers, solar power generation, and solar cell applications. , Production in one, construction of the country's largest, Asia's first, the world's third national solar photovoltaic industrial park.” Such a statement can be copied to another local government leader.

According to public information, there are photovoltaic industrial parks in 13 prefecture-level cities in Jiangsu Province, and there are more than 20 large-scale photovoltaic companies. Hundreds of them are small and medium enterprises. Looking across the country, more than 600 cities use photovoltaics as a strategic emerging industry. In some cities in the western part of China, there are several dozen square kilometers of photovoltaic power station planning land. According to statistics, in addition to Tibet, other provinces have proposed development plans for polysilicon, and all are 100 billion projects.

"Some cities simply do not have the foundation, there are no conditions, there is no industrial support, completely disregarding the actual situation." Meng Xianwei, deputy director of the China Renewable Energy Society, commented.

However, no one expected that the photovoltaic industry had risen in the tide in less than 10 years, and it had declined again.

As an investment industry, investment in photovoltaic products has reached ten billion yuan. Where does such a huge source of funds come from? It is certainly not enough for enterprises to rely on their own funds. Bank loans have thus become an important source. The domestic photovoltaic industry giant, LDK’s polysilicon project investment launched in 2007 has reached a staggering 12 billion yuan, which is a single project with the largest amount of investment in the industry in the world and the largest capacity design. Most of the funds come from For bank loans. In March 2013, when assets were cleared after the bankruptcy of Suntech, the total foreign currency and foreign currency loans the company obtained in the banking system amounted to approximately RMB 3.636 billion, of which 8 Chinese banks were involved.

How many bank loans are invested in the photovoltaic industry? Although there are no accurate figures, when assessing the double-return losses, relevant departments issued a data: they will face “more than RMB 200 billion in non-performing loan risks” and the scale of bank loans. This can be a little known.

Zhao Yuwen said that the development of photovoltaics is itself a kind of exchange for the resources of the entire people. When companies go bankrupt, they will abduct the government. The government is related to banks, credit and taxes, and it is also related to the employment of the people. Thus, once a company goes bankrupt, it is not only the company that loses it, but also the assets of the people owned by the government.

It has been widely observed that the industries riped by the government’s tangible and rapidly declining industries are far from the photovoltaic industry. Similar stories have been repeatedly staged in many emerging industries such as biomass, wind power and LED. “Next, both the wind power and the LED industry may have a double reaction.” Is this an alarmist or a warning?

Chaos 5: Unbalanced Supply and Demand If China is merely monopolizing the photovoltaic market in Europe, the imbalance between supply and demand may still have room for relaxation. However, the actual situation is that China’s production capacity now covers even far more than the global market. demand.

According to the forecast data of the European Photovoltaic Industry Association, the PV market demand in 2012 and 2013 is between 20~40GW. According to the recent incomplete statistics of the Seidi Think Tank Photovoltaic Institute, in 2012, China's 156 battery module companies had more than 40 GW of solar cell capacity.

The inevitable result of the imbalance between supply and demand is product price cuts, profit reduction, and business failures.

First of all, it is unsustainable for European and American companies. According to the statistics of the CCID think-tank photovoltaic institute: From 2010 to 2012, there were about 35 bankruptcy batteries and wafers in Europe.

In August 2011, there were three solar companies in the United States that declared bankruptcy, including the prestigious California Solar Power Company in the industry, Evergreen Solar and Spectra Solar.

Solon, a German solar energy company that once was the world's top solar panel maker, filed for bankruptcy in December 2011. The company was the first photovoltaic company to be listed in Germany in 1998 and had a stock price of up to 89 euros.

In April 2012, q-cells, one of the largest PV companies in Germany, filed for bankruptcy. The company’s 2011 loss amounted to 846 million euros, or about 1.1 billion US dollars.

Followed by Chinese companies.

On March 20, 2013, Suntech announced its bankruptcy and restructuring. This giant, whose stock price was as high as $90, sales revenue of 30 billion yuan, and a market value of over 10 billion U.S. dollars, crashed overnight.

Photovoltaic industry fell into a quagmire of losses. According to Wang Bohua, secretary general of the China Photovoltaic Industry Alliance, in 2012, China's polysilicon industry lost all of its line, and more than 80% of the polysilicon enterprises stopped production, including two bankruptcies. In August 2012, the US investment organization Maxim Group released a research report saying that the accumulated debt of the top ten solar energy companies in China has reached $17.5 billion, and the entire industry is close to bankruptcy.

It is not without warning that the photovoltaic industry has emerged from today's situation.

On September 26, 2009, the State Council forwarded to the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other 10 ministries and commissions "Some Opinions on Suppressing Overcapacity in Some Industries and Duplicate Construction and Leading the Healthy Development of Industries" (abbreviation No. 38), officially including polysilicon. Excess production capacity and redundant construction industries, and positioned polysilicon as a high-energy-consuming and highly polluting product.

However, in fact, there were different attitudes supported by different data in the experts of relevant ministries at that time. At the same time, the industry is even more brave and aggressive.

Soon, the plunge came.

According to the statistics of the Saidi Think Tank Photovoltaic Institute, the price of polysilicon in China compared with that of 2007 three years ago, the price fell to only one-third of the then peak. By 2012, polysilicon prices continued to fall, only half of 2010, to 20 US dollars / kg. In June 2013, the price of polysilicon in China was US$18/kg. In 6 years, the price of polysilicon dropped by more than 90%. This price is already lower than the domestic polysilicon manufacturing cost line. It is understood that the current cost of many domestic polysilicon companies is generally more than 30 US dollars / kg.

The price of photovoltaic modules is also lower than the cost. In 2012 and June 2013, domestic solar PV modules were quoted at 0.7 U.S. dollars per watt. At that time, the production cost of photovoltaic modules was generally at 0.84 US$/W, and the price of PV products for vertical integration was between 0.75 and 0.9 US$/W. Compared with 2007, the prices of PV modules also fell heavily in 2013, less than 20% of the current price of US$3.8/Watt.

Chaos 6: Different subsidies In the world, various countries have adopted the photovoltaic industry as a strategic emerging industry and introduced various subsidies.

For Germany, which has the largest installed capacity of photovoltaics, their subsidies for the photovoltaic industry are mainly subsidies to users. In 2000, Germany promulgated the "Renewable Energy Law". One of its main features is the "fixed on-grid tariff" policy. The grid company must fully purchase photovoltaic power generation on-grid electricity. Japan’s policy tilt also reflects its subsidy to users.

In China, subsidies for the photovoltaic industry focus on the manufacturing process. Taking the Golden Sun demonstration project that began in 2009 as an example, the “Circular on Implementation of the Golden Sun Demonstration Project” jointly issued by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Energy Bureau stipulates that the photovoltaic power plant project will be invested by project (about 29 yuan/Watt). 50% will be given state subsidies. For an independent photovoltaic power generation system in remote, non-electric areas, subsidies will be given at 70% of investment.

In the eyes of the state, it is a supportive policy. It has become a synonym for subsidies in some places and enterprises. The application of the first phase of the Golden Sun demonstration project set off a boom in the provinces. According to the policy, the maximum number of declarations in each province cannot exceed 20 MW, but only one province in Shandong Province has reported that more than 100 MW is reported to the province; in contrast, powerful PV companies, such as the Yingli Group, report the scale of Up to 50 megawatts.

In 2009, when the policy was promulgated, more than 100 megawatts of the Golden Sun demonstration project was started. The actual installed capacity of that year was about 300 megawatts. The Ministry of Finance provided a subsidy of nearly 5 billion yuan.

However, with the project subcontracting, random trading of roads, components and shoddy, heavy construction and light management phenomenon. In the second year of the policy's enactment only --- 2010, the Ministry of Finance announced the cancellation of 39 "environmentally built, shoddy" projects with a total installed capacity of 54 megawatts, including Wuxi Suntech, Artes, BP and other well-known PV companies at home and abroad are the owners of the project. In 2012, 15 companies such as Shanxi International Power PV, ZTE, and Baoli Photovoltaic were added to this list.

In the contest between regulators and declarers, this policy has been maintained until 2013. The final accounting result is that since the beginning of 2009, a total of more than 900 projects have been listed on the subsidy list, and the central government has subsidized these projects by more than 20 billion yuan. What is the huge amount of subsidies in exchange? The relevant data show that since the Golden Sun demonstration project approved in 2009, only 40% of the total installed capacity has been connected to the grid, and other projects have not been completed due to various conditions. extension.

“This is bound to be a short-term transitional policy,” the person concerned commented.

Shi Zhengrong once stated that he hopes to see a policy like Germany that subsidizes the on-grid tariff of PV. Grid companies must have the enthusiasm to buy, and end users are happy to use it, which is the key to the development of the industry.

Gao Hongling, deputy director of the Center for Computer and Microelectronics Development and Research (China Software Testing Center) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, stated that in the early days of the photovoltaic industry, the country did not apply large-scale subsidies to the application side of photovoltaic products as it did to the upstream. One of the important reasons for creating strong, weak applications.

With the rapid development of the photovoltaic industry, does China's photovoltaic companies have sufficient independent innovation capabilities to reduce the cost of photovoltaic power generation to the level of conventional power generation in 5 to 10 years? Can the efficiency of solar cells be improved in 5 to 10 years? What is the level necessary to reduce costs? Is it confident that in 5 to 10 years, China will not only be a major producer of solar cells, but will also become a major application country of photovoltaic power generation? This is the "Changzhou Declaration" of the 10th China Solar PV Conference in 2008. An excerpt from this section, read today, still remains in the ears.